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Abstract
Corporate governance has become a buzzword of the global business community and is now 
receiving even wider attention given the repercussions of the Enron collapse. Although there 
is a burgeoning literature on this topic, the bulk of it is either highly normative or focused on 
corporate governance practices at the level of the ﬁrm. In contrast, our aim is to explain the 
current transformations of corporate governance regulation. Whereas this regulation used to be 
a distinctly national affair, it is now increasingly an area subject to both public and private (self-
) regulation in multiple arenas, of which three are outstandingly important as well as closely 
interrelated and, therefore, form the empirical focus of the programme:
- Europeanisation in the area of corporate governance regulation affects national regimes 
of corporate governance with a particular historical diversity, without entirely replacing 
them. 
- The EU, furthermore, does not operate in a vacuum but in a transatlantic and global 
context where it has to negotiate its choices with both state (mainly the US) and non-state 
actors. At the global level, private bodies such as the International Accounting Standards 
Board set many corporate governance standards, and international organisations like the 
OECD disseminate norms for good corporate governance. 
- Central and East European countries (CEEC) are exposed to the multiple (and partially 
conﬂicting) demands by global institutions and the EU when developing their corporate 
governance structures.
All three projects focus on our central research question: What explains the transformation of 
corporate governance regulation at different levels, and through varying modes, of governance? 
We will draw on two bodies of existing theory, i.e. the transnational political economy approach 
and the resource dependency theory on transnational policy networks. This programme aims to 
combine the strong empirical focus on institutional forms of the latter with the strong explanatory 
potential in terms of structural forces and power relations of the ﬁrst. The paper gives a ﬁrst 
outline of the research design.
This paper is based on a grant proposal to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc 
Research (NWO) for a four year programme entitled ʻThe transnational political economy of 
corporate governance regulationʼ, which was awarded in September 2003. Details of the NWO 
programme Shifts in Governance (the context in which this grant has been awarded) can be 
found on the NWO website (www.nwo.nl). The applicants were the authors of this Working 
Paper, in collaboration with Professor Jan Klaassen RA, the Dean of the Faculty of Economics 
and Business Administration of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
11. Introduction
Corporate governance – which can be deﬁned as the way a company is ʻgovernedʼ, for which 
purpose and to whose beneﬁt – has in the 1990s become a buzzword of the global business 
community. It is now receiving even wider attention given the worldwide repercussions of the 
Enron collapse and other recent corporate scandals, which have demonstrated the considerable 
social and political impact of deﬁcient corporate governance regulation. A further erosion of 
public trust in corporate governance arrangements, it is feared, may in fact trigger a fundamental 
economic crisis. Moreover, the noted role of both private actors and international organisations 
– that is next to democratically elected governments – in the regulation of corporate governance 
raises considerable problems of legitimacy and accountability. In this context, corporate 
governance is an important object of ongoing debate, both in the European (for instance with 
respect to the controversial take-over directive) and the transatlantic arenas (for instance around 
the possible adoption of so called International Accounting Standards ).
Although it remains to be seen in which direction the regulatory reforms that are now called 
for in the wake of these scandals would take us (Hopt 2002), it is clear that already long before 
Enron, the regulation of corporate governance – which is at the heart of the way capitalism is 
organised in modern societies – has been in a process of major transformation within different 
socio-economic settings. Whereas the regulation of corporate governance used to be a distinctly 
national affair, it is now increasingly an area subject to both public and private (self-)regulation 
in multiple arenas, of which three are outstandingly important as well as closely interrelated:
- Europeanisation in the area of corporate governance regulation affects national regimes 
of corporate governance with a particular historical diversity, without entirely replacing 
them. 
- The EU, furthermore, does not operate in a vacuum but in a transatlantic and global 
context where it has to negotiate its choices with both state (mainly the US) and non-state 
actors. At the global level, private bodies such as the International Accounting Standards 
Board set many corporate governance standards, and international organisations like the 
OECD disseminate norms for good corporate governance. 
- Central and East European countries (CEEC) are exposed to the multiple (and partially 
conﬂicting) demands by global institutions and the EU when developing their corporate 
governance structures.
The discussion on the political economy of corporate governance is situated in two broader 
contexts. First, corporate governance regulation has been one of the issues touched on in the 
debate on globalisation and the possible convergence of (national) varieties of capitalism. 
According to some observers, especially within the ﬁeld of international and comparative 
political economy, these regulatory changes within multiple arenas of governance point to a 
convergence on the so called Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and away from the Rhineland 
model and other models of ʻco-ordinated capitalism  ʼ (Hall and Soskice 2001; Crouch and 
2Streeck 1997; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998). To what extent can we indeed observe such 
a transformation and convergence of corporate governance regulation? What explains both the 
form and the content of these regulatory changes? 
Second, we build upon but at the same time move beyond the global governance (Held and 
McGrew 2002, Hewson and Sinclair 1999) and the multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 
2001) literatures, especially by highlighting the interplay of global and European governance 
arenas. Although there is now a burgeoning academic literature on corporate governance, there 
is in fact surprisingly little research available addressing the above questions in a systematic 
way, especially, which we would suggest is crucial, across different but interrelated levels of 
governance. In fact much of the literature is either highly normative or focused on corporate 
governance practices at the level of the ﬁrm. This paper, in contrast, seeks to go beyond this 
by outlining a research agenda aimed at explaining the current transformations of corporate 
governance regulation. In our approach, to be detailed below, we hope to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing bodies of literature. We focus on the autonomous agency of 
private actors and this will enable us to move beyond simplistic and deterministic accounts 
of globalisation. Moreover, as our approach also highlights the interplay of private and public 
governance we hope to offer new insights into this critical aspect of the current ʻshifts in 
governanceʼ.
The paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the relevant literature on 
corporate governance regulation. Section 3 then presents the core questions and approach of our 
own research agenda. Section 4 outlines how the central research questions will be addressed 
through three interrelated research projects. Section 5 concludes the paper with a statement of 
what we hope to achieve with this research.
2. State of Empirical Research on Corporate Governance Regulation 
The growing volume of research relating to changing corporate governance regulation may 
roughly be divided into two different types of literature:
• Literature with a highly normative (implicit or explicit) orientation, especially in law but 
also in economics and business studies;
• Literature in which regulation is an independent variable and which is often based on 
research of one or two national cases (whose corporate governance practices then form the 
dependent variable);
The literature within legal studies is usually the most explicit in its normative agenda. Some 
authors argue in favour of giving more voice to stakeholders (e.g. Ireland 1996; Deakin 2002). 
Others, indeed a majority, focus on the question of how to enhance (legally) the (property) rights 
of shareholders (see, e.g., Baums and Scott 2003), especially so-called minority shareholders 
such as institutional investors (see, e.g., Black 1992; Baums et al. 1994). Though the legal 
3research on corporate governance sometimes claims to be explanatory, it is in reality descriptive 
and often prescriptive. An illustration may be found in an an often quoted paper which predicts 
the convergence of corporate law around the primacy of shareholder interests on the basis of 
the ʻideological and competitive attractions  ʼof this model, forming the basis of a normative 
consensus leading to an inevitable ʻend of history for corporate law  ʼ(Hansmann and Kraakman 
2000: 32). Though some of this literature is comparative, most of it is focused on the US, 
reﬂecting that countryʼs longer history of shareholder activism, and, recently, the impact of 
Enron and the legal reforms (especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) that have been undertaken in 
response (e.g., Coffee 2003) 
Although purportedly intended to explain the varied behaviour of ﬁrms and the varied 
performance of economies under different systems of corporate governance, much work in the 
economics discipline is (implicitly) rather normative in orientation too. Especially so called 
agency theory is based on the highly normative assumption that a ﬁrm is no more than a piece 
of property owned by its shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1993; Schleifer and 
Vishny 1996) whose rational interest is to maximise the cash ﬂow – i.e. shareholder value 
(Rappaport 1986) – ﬂowing from those property titles. Any institutional arrangement that makes 
managers, as the agents of the shareholders, behave in a way that does not maximise the interest 
of the principal, for instance by seeking to serve other interests (e.g. of employees or of long-
term survival of the ﬁrm) as well, is therefore considered as a problem. 
The second body of literature, which attempts to move beyond abstract modelling and 
normative proclamations and actually explain things but still takes regulation largely as an 
independent variable, is to be found both within law and within the social sciences. Within the 
former, the best-known example of this type of research is the work of Mark Roe (1994) with 
his study on the political roots of a US managerial capitalism of ʻstrong managers and weak 
ownersʼ. Next to these more politico-legal and historical enquiries (almost all of which focus on 
the US) into why corporate governance practices (including the performance of these systems) 
have developed the way they have, there is also a growing number of more micro-level and 
quantitative studies that seek to analyse corporate governance practices at the level of the ﬁrm. 
Here especially research on German corporate governance that has come out of the Max Planck 
Institute in Cologne may be mentioned (Höpner 2001; Goyer 2002; for an overview see Streeck 
2001). This research is path breaking to the extent that such ﬁrm-level research was notably 
absent from the ﬁeld before and in fact is critical in helping to understand to which extent and 
how corporate governance regimes are actually changing ʻ on the groundʼ. Indeed, we recognise 
that ultimately the practice of corporate governance is what counts, and hence acknowledge 
the signiﬁcance of such research. Nevertheless, it is also clear that in this type of research the 
regulatory environment can only be treated as an independent variable that as such remains 
unexplained. Shifting the focus, then, we seek to explain the changing corporate governance 
regulation that is the legal and regulatory framework that in part shapes the practice of corporate 
governance. 
4Inasmuch as scholars have tackled the theme of corporate governance regulation, their 
studies are more conceptual and/or exploratory rather than providing solid research ﬁndings, 
especially beyond single national case studies. With regard to the conceptual level, the political 
science literature has been especially useful in contributing to the development of a typology 
of competing (national) regimes of corporate governance. Particularly useful is the distinction 
between the so called ʻshareholder model  ʼof the ʻAtlantic  ʼ(Anglo-Saxon) capitalist economies 
premised on the sovereignty of shareholders exercising their power through the stock exchange 
– constituting a market for corporate control – on the one hand, and the stakeholder model 
prevalent in most continental European capitalist economies (and in particular within the so 
called ʻRhineland  ʼcountries), in which the ﬁrm and its management are more embedded in a 
network of interests, on the other (see, e.g., Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998; De Jong 1996; Dore 
et al 1999; Vitols 2001; see also Albert 1993). The limited empirical research that is available 
concentrates on the question of convergence of national models of corporate governance 
regulation and is either sceptical towards the convergence thesis (e.g., Vitols 2001), or seems to 
adopt that thesis rather uncritically (e.g. OʼSullivan 2000a). In neither case, however, does the 
evidence appear to be conclusive. Moreover, this research does not (explicitly) take into account 
levels of governance beyond that of the nation-state. Inasmuch as this has been done (e.g. 
Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998; Lannoo 1999) much more extensive research is needed. 
 We may thus conclude that in the existing bodies of literature one cannot ﬁnd a systematic 
analysis of the political and economic determinants of the regulatory environment of corporate 
governance at different and interacting levels of governance. Hence, in the next section we 
argue the need for the development of a coherent political economy framework that will enable 
us to undertake such a research.
3. Towards a Transnational Political Economy of Multi-level Corporate Governance 
Regulation: Questions and Approach
In contrast to the normative orientation, our aim – though recognising the important normative 
dimension of the subject matter - is to explain the current transformations of corporate 
governance regulation. In order to come to a fuller understanding of what is driving the current 
transformation of corporate governance it is crucial to also analyse the politics of corporate 
governance regulation. Which political processes drive the current transformation of corporate 
governance at different levels of governance? Which political and socio-economic actors are 
involved; what are their interests, and how are relations of power between them conﬁgured?
We argue that in order to capture the multi-level phenomenon of changing corporate governance 
regulation, we have to move beyond national case studies or cross-national comparisons 
and adopt instead an integrated transnational approach in which we examine how corporate 
governance regulation is changing through interacting levels of governance and within different 
arenas. From this perspective, we formulate the following research question:
5What explains the transformation of corporate governance regulation at different levels, 
and through varying modes, of governance?
This central question gives rise to three sets of sub-questions: 
• What changes in the regulation of management–shareholder relations can we observe 
in different arenas (global, EU, CEEC), and do these changes reveal convergence on a 
particular model or rather a continuing or increased institutional diversity?
• How, or through what modes of regulation and at which levels of governance do these 
changes take place? Are there signiﬁcant shifts in governance: from public to private and 
from the national to the European or global levels? 
• Why is this so? What explains both the changing content of corporate governance regulation 
and the changing form through which it takes place? 
Theoretical and Analytical Approach
Inasmuch as the current literature in fact deals with the question of why corporate governance 
regulation is changing – whereby the assumption is often that it is converging on the Anglo-
Saxon model – the conventional answer tends to be that it is driven by economic globalisation 
understood as apolitical market selection process (cf. OʼSullivan 2000a; Ciofﬁ 2000; Vitols 
2001). Such an explanation in our view would be too simplistic as it ignores the fact a) that 
the globalisation of markets itself is being enabled by changing state (de-) regulation, and b) 
that the policies formulated in response to market globalisation are the outcome of political 
struggles which are not predetermined but in which different interests and preferences compete 
for dominance. 
Rather than reducing explanations to exogenous globalisation pressures, we seek to 
recognise the underlying interests of concrete socio-economic groups such as managers, (various 
categories of) shareholders and employees. Within the context of globalisation relevant actors 
increasingly operate on a transnational plane, and governance – public and private – shifts 
towards new and multiple levels. Transnational actors mediate between these different levels 
and link globalisation with European and national forms of change (Van Apeldoorn 2002). 
The various actors - with often diverging interests and thus engaged in political struggle – are 
in turn inﬂuenced by structural factors at different levels, from economic globalisation to the 
socio-economic and political institutions of a particular state. The topic of corporate governance 
in particular seems to call for such an integrated approach. It refers both to the governance 
of corporations at the level of the corporations themselves and to the public governance 
(regulation) that sets the legal framework within which corporate governance practices are 
situated. In addition it furthermore refers to the self-regulation or private governance that ﬂows 
from private international forums. 
6The regulation of corporate governance moreover increasingly takes place at different but 
interacting levels: at the global level through bodies like the OECD and the World Economic 
Forum, at the European level - where, in addition to the process of ﬁnancial market integration, 
attempts are undertaken to harmonise relevant company law -, and at the national level - where 
we still ﬁnd much country-speciﬁc regulation, albeit challenged by the governance efforts at 
these other levels. In other words, the changing nature of corporate governance regulation is a 
transnational and multi-level phenomenon by deﬁnition and therefore in our view also requires 
a transnational approach that recognises how the different levels, regions and (public/private) 
forms of governance are interrelated. 
Here we draw on two existing theoretical approaches, the transnational political economy 
approach (Van Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner 2003, Overbeek 2003), and the resource 
dependency theory on transnational policy networks (Nölke 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). This 
programme aims to combine the strong empirical focus on institutional forms of the latter with 
the strong explanatory potential in terms of structural forces and power relations of the ﬁrst. 
What both of these approaches share – contra to state-centric approaches – is their stress 
on the fundamental transnational dimension of contemporary politics (see Overbeek 2003; 
Nölke 2003c; van Apeldoorn forthcoming). We seek to conceptualise the transnational in 
terms of both structure and agency. With regard to the latter we conceive of transnational 
actors as transcending the territoriality of national states, whilst at the same time stressing 
that this does not mean that their agency no longer takes place in any national context, rather 
it does not take place in any single national context, but on different levels of governance. 
Indeed, transnationalism by deﬁnition is a multi-level phenomenon. With regard to structure, 
we emphasise how transnational socio-economic structures shape the agency of both national 
and transnational actors, where the latter in particular are also inﬂuenced by the transnational 
institutional and organisational setting in which they operate. 
The speciﬁc contribution of the resource dependency approach lies in the fact that it 
provides an alternative to conventional theories of international relations and international 
political economy in that it gives considerable space to the activities of private actors. Moreover, 
building upon (but going beyond) earlier theories of transnational relations (Keohane and Nye 
1971, Risse-Kappen 1995) and multi-level governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996, Marks 
and Hooghe 2001), it offers a rather precise analytical framework that is able to capture cross-
border political processes that defy the conventional government-centric model. At the core of 
the (transnational) policy network approach is the (transnational) co-operation of public and 
private actors for policy design and implementation, based on inter-organizational resource 
dependencies. These networks link different levels of governance, be they supranational, 
national or subnational ones. Their relevance depend on the allocation of resources between 
organizational actors, such as national ministries, international secretariats and interest groups. 
Resource allocations are very much inﬂuenced by the network context, both in its institutional 
and structural dimensions.
7Whereas the resource dependency approach is able to analytically capture the complex 
interplay of different actors within the transnational political economy of corporate governance 
regulation, its rather abstract and a-historical character is too limited for a comprehensive 
explanation of these regulations. Although the resource dependency approach focuses on the 
interplay between inter-organizational dynamics and network context, it is unable to locate 
this context in a broader historical dynamic. Furthermore, its focus on organizational resource 
attributes favours a relational power approach, thereby underplaying the structural dimension 
of power. This is where the transnational political economy approach has its comparative 
advantages. Although lacking operational precision for a detailed analysis of the political 
economy of individual regulation processes, it provides a comprehensive perspective that allows 
for the situation of these micro-processes in the overall development of capitalist state-society 
relations within the current world order. By focusing on the development and consolidation of 
hegemonic transnational class strategies, it captures both the structural dimension of power 
– as inherent in the social relations of capitalist production – as well as the fundamental role of 
agency in reproducing those structural inequalities. 
Empirical focus of research 
We deﬁne corporate governance broadly as the rules and practices governing the power relations 
between the various stakeholders in the modern corporation: shareholders, creditors, managers, 
workers, then state and elements of society at large (cf. Jackson 2001, Hopt et al. 1999: 5, 
OʼSullivan 2000a: 1). Within the broader institutional conﬁguration three sets of relations can 
be deemed central: those between management and owners (ʻshareholder relationsʼ), those 
between management and workers (ʻemployee relationsʼ) and those between corporation and 
civil society and the state (ʻsocietal relationsʼ). In order to delimit its empirical scope, the focus 
of the research programme is on shareholder relations.
Relations between shareholders and management are central to the struggle over ownership 
and control, which is at the heart of corporate governance ( Becht et al 2002; OʼSullivan 2000b; 
Berle and Means 1991). Indeed, in the US the efforts to undo what Berle and Means (1991) 
have identiﬁed as the separation of ownership and control – a ʻshareholder revolt  ʼas reﬂected 
by the ideology of shareholder value (Lazonick and OʼSullivan 2000; cf. Rappaport 1986) - 
ﬁrst ignited the debate on corporate governance. This issue is also central to the recent political 
struggles on corporate governance. Management – shareholder relations can in turn be seen as 
consisting of three major components. Here, we follow the common distinction between exit 
and voice (Hirschman 1970) or between external – through the market for corporate control - 
and internal – through the governing structure of the corporation itself - mechanisms of control 
that shareholders can or cannot exercise over management or over the corporation (Jensen 
1993). The third key issue is that of transparency and accountability, the regulation of which is 
highly relevant to both internal and external dimensions. We thus arrive at the following three 
key instances of regulation:
8• The internal governance structure of the ﬁrm
• The external control structure of the ﬁrm
• Regulation affecting transparency and accountability
Research methods
The core methods of the programme will be semi-standardized expert interviews, combined 
with the analysis of archival or documentary sources. Interlocutors will primarily be identiﬁed 
within interest groups, government agencies, international organisations and private self-
regulatory bodies. Typical documents to be analysed will be diverse (draft) corporate governance 
or accounting standards as well as position papers by various actors. Earlier research by the 
applicants has proven the adequacy of this methodology for similar purposes (e.g. van Apeldoorn 
2002). Given the complexity of multi-level corporate governance regulation and the early, 
explorative stage of theory development, the utilisation of more quantitative methods appears 
to be less advisable. We may, however, utilise a simple form of network analysis in order to 
visualise the relative position of various interested parties within the development of corporate 
governance standards (cf. Nölke 1995 for an example of this method). In order to increase the 
validity of our ﬁndings, we will circulate draft project reports to all original interlocutors before 
publication, for veriﬁcation and comments.
4. Outline of Empirical Research: Three Integrated Projects
The programme will have a matrix organization, where each project has the responsibility 
for the integration of the ﬁndings on one of the three governance levels and on one of the 
three elements of corporate governance. The combination of governance elements and arenas 
derives from the highly controversial character of the market for corporate control within the 
European Union, whereas only in the CEEC entire internal governance structures had to be 
developed from scratch; global (private) standards are most prominently being set in the issue 
area of transparency and accountability. This organization combines a complex, comprehensive 
approach with an efﬁcient division of responsibilities:
9Issue:
Arena:
External 
Protection
Internal Representation
Transparency & 
Accountability
European Union
European Market for 
Corporate Control
(Project 1)
CEEC
Introduction of 
Corporate Governance 
Regulation in CEEC
(Project 2)
Global Economy
Global Private Authority 
and Corporate 
Governance
(Project 3)
Figure 1 Three integrated projects
Project 1: The Transformation of Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union
Currently, the continental ʻstakeholder model  ʼ - in which the ﬁrm and its management are 
embedded in a network of interests - is in a process of transformation, raising the question of 
a convergence on the Anglo-Saxon ʻshareholder model  ʼ (Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998; 
Streeck 2001; cf. Vitols 2001). A key characteristic of the stakeholder model is the absence of 
a market for corporate control, which constitutes the primary external mechanism of control 
for shareholders (Jensen 1993; Bittlingmayer 1998). There are, however, signs that such a 
market - following earlier US developments where the emergence of a takeover market has 
been concomitant to rising shareholder power (Useem 1993) - is now slowly developing on the 
continent (OECD 1998; Lannoo 1999; Höpner and Jackson 2001; cf. Barca and Becht 2001). The 
EU is contributing to this development, in particular, through its proposed takeover directive. 
The directiveʼs earlier defeat by the European Parliament (after German opposition) and its 
relaunching following a study by a ʻhigh level group of experts  ʼ(Winter 2002a) demonstrates 
both the controversial nature of the issue (Ciofﬁ 2001) and the commitment of the EU to push 
this through as part of its ambition to complete the integration of Europeʼs capital markets by 
2005. 
The struggle around the takeover directive – as well as a number of related proposals (see Winter 
2002b) – is thus a good case to study the political economy of the ʻbattle of the systems  ʼ(Story 
and Walter 1997) that is taking place in Europe. As the development of a European market for 
corporate control would ﬁt with, but at the same time strengthen, the globalisation of capital 
markets in which transnationally mobile investors increase their exit power, an analysis of this 
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Europeanisation of corporate governance regulation may also offer a better understanding of 
the extent, and ways, through which changes within the European arena of governance are 
related to global developments. 
This project hence focuses on the following research questions:
• What is the role of the EU in creating a European market for corporate control and to which 
extent does this Europeanisation imply a convergence on the Anglo-Saxon model? 
• How does this particular Europeanisation of the regulation of corporate governance relate 
to national regulatory changes on the one hand and global/transatlantic developments on the 
other?
• What explains this Europeanisation in terms of both form and content? In particular, what 
accounts for the EUʼs push for a European market for corporate control?
This project will analyse the transformation of corporate governance regulation in the European 
Union from a transnational and multi-level perspective in which the emergence of a European 
governance structure is placed within the context of developments within the global arena. 
Rather than taking globalisation, though, as simply the driving force behind national regulatory 
change, we take it that the European level of governance constitutes an important mediating 
variable in this respect, and that both form and content of Europeanisation is in turn mediated 
and shaped by transnational actors operating both within and beyond the European arena (Van 
Apeldoorn 2002). In explaining the content of (proposed) EU-level regulation, we should thus 
analyse the role of interests originating inside as well as outside (e.g., US institutional investors) 
the EU. The explanatory thrust of our transnational political economy approach emphasises, 
on the one hand, the agency of these transnational social forces, while on the other hand, also 
taking into account the changing structures of the global economy that in part shape this agency. 
With regard to the form, the fact that in the Europeanisation of corporate governance regulation, 
a key role is played by the so called ʻHigh Level Group of Company Experts  ʼ – in itself a 
transnational actor - may also point to a signiﬁcant shift in the mode of governance. 
 This project aims at the development of a transnational political economy explaining 
the changing European regulation of shareholder-management relations within corporate 
governance, in particular the issue of the external control structure as exempliﬁed by the 
proposed takeover directive. 
This project will contribute to the existing academic state-of-the-art because:
• The study of the struggle around attempts to create a European market for corporate control 
will shed new light on the question of convergence on the Anglo-Saxon model;
• Attempts to chart and explain the changing regulation of corporate governance at the EU 
level so far have been limited and not based on in depth empirical research (cf. Rhodes and 
Van Apeldoorn 1998; Bieling and Steinhilber 2002). 
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• By placing Europeanisation within a wider global context and examining the linkages 
between the European and transatlantic arenas we will advance our understanding of multi-
level governance in the EU.
The outcome of the European struggle over which model of corporate governance to adopt is 
at the heart of a wider struggle over Europeʼs socio-economic order and thus affects the fate of 
European societies to a large degree. In spite of this, the mode of governance through which the 
(changing) regulation of corporate governance takes place, revolves around distant institutions 
and closed ʻexpert groupsʼ, thus raising issues of legitimacy and accountability. 
Project 2: Transnational Forces and Corporate Governance Regulations in Central Europe 
This project studies the struggles over the introduction of corporate governance (CG) regulation 
within the Central and East European transition economies during the last 10 to 15 years. In the 
economic transformation from plan to market, the ﬁrst step has been the imposition of ﬁnancial 
discipline (eliminate government subsidies, easy credit, payment arrears) and competition 
(World Bank 1996, 45). The second step consisted in the creation of property rights and their 
lock-in through privatisation and the attraction of foreign capital (World Bank 1996, 48; also 
Frydman and Rapaczynski 1993, Rapaczynski 1996, Böröcz 1999). Experience quickly showed 
that privatisation was no panacea: a host of problems transpired, all pointing to the need for 
an appropriate institutional context (Stiglitz 2001, Rapacki 2000, OECD 2001). The third step 
in the transition process therefore consisted in the adoption of a CG system (Johnson/Shleifer 
2002). By 1994, ﬁve countries had made signiﬁcant progress towards matching the growth of 
the private sector with capital market and CG mechanisms, a situation not markedly different 
by 2000: Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland (Estrin 2001, 17). Given the 
special history of Slovenia as one of the successor states to the Yugoslav Federation, this project 
will concentrate mainly on the original four Central European members of the Visegrad group.
The transition process, and the introduction of institutions and regulatory practices underpinning 
the emerging market economy, cannot be understood as an endogenous process. The literature 
on CG in Central Europe mostly ignores external inﬂuences: at best we can ﬁnd scattered 
references to either the Anglo-Saxon or the continental European model of CG being adopted in 
Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Phelps et al. 1993, Garrod 2000, Rapacki 2000 and McCarthy/
Puffer 2002). This relative oversight is remarkable given the degree of involvement by various 
Western actors in the transition process (for instance see Berglöf/von Thadden 1999 and 
especially Meaney 1995). 
The project will focus on the following research questions:
• What are the mechanisms through which corporate governance regulation is transmitted 
to the new market economies in Central Europe, and what are the main (domestic as 
well as foreign) intermediaries in this process?
12
• Do the activities of public and private international organisations lead to a substantial 
convergence of (internal) corporate governance structures in Central Europe, or do we 
observe rivalry and divergence between different concepts of corporate regulation?
• How can we explain the trajectory of corporate governance regulation in Central 
Europe and how can we theorise the dialectic interaction between domestic forces and 
transnational inﬂuences?
This project departs from the assumption that ʻtransition  ʼrepresents the internationalisation of 
the state in the context of neo-liberal globalisation. During that process the state is transformed 
from an institution that shields the domestic social formation from external inﬂuences to the 
institution whose function is to adjust domestic structures and policies to the exigencies of 
the liberalising global economy. This involves a restructuring of state agencies into a new 
hierarchy with the agencies controlling the insertion of the national into the global economy 
(ministries of ﬁnance in particular) (Cox 1987, 253-265). This internationalisation of the state 
is complemented by the impact of the growing nébuleuse of private and quasi-state institutions, 
agencies and forums in the global economy (Cox 1992) that determine the distinctive forms in 
which neo-liberal global governance occurs in continuous interplay with similar developments 
at the regional and the national levels.
 This approach has been applied to the accession process of Central European countries 
to the EU (Holman 2001) and to the transnationalisation of the Polish state (Shields 2002). 
Deacon (1997) has studied the role of both European and global international organisations 
in the formation of social policy in Central and Eastern Europe. There is, however, no study 
that presents a detailed analysis of the role of private actors alongside (inter)governmental 
organisations. The project aims at the analysis and explanation of the inﬂuence of external 
(f)actors on the content and mode of corporate governance regulation in general, and company 
law in particular, in Central Europe between 1989 and the present.
 The project will make a substantial contribution to the literature on the politics of 
corporate governance in Central Europe, and more in particular it will:
• Contribute a novel perspective to the literature on the political economy of transition in 
Central Europe,
• Employ the concepts developed in the multi-level governance and ʻEuropeanisation  ʼ
literature in the study of the accession process,
• Contribute to the literature on the role of transnational actors and private authority in 
global governance.
 The project has three societal audiences: 
• Various societal groups in Central Europe (and other transition countries undergoing 
the same restructuring process) who lack detailed information about the international 
context of seemingly national developments; 
• Societal groups of similar nature in the EU concerned with the accession process;
• Equivalent groups concerned with forms and modes of global governance.
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Representatives of such groups (trade unions, employers organisations and business associations, 
political parties etc.) will participate in the workshops to be organised by the programme. 
A special effort will be made to include a substantial representation from Central European 
countries. 
Project 3:  Global private authority and corporate governance
The evolution of private authority over corporate governance has considerably intensiﬁed during 
the last years – out of the 35 (mostly private) corporate governance codes currently existing in 
the EU Member States, 25 have been issued since 1997 (Weil, Gotshal and Manges 2002: 2). 
Although there are a number of competing standards, there has been a strong tendency towards 
substantial convergence. Remaining differences primarily reﬂect the association with different 
(national) models of capitalism. Furthermore, some private standards have been endorsed 
by public authorities, on the national, European and global level. Thus, private authority on 
corporate governance has become enmeshed in a complex web of multi-level governance. 
Given the dominance of economic and legal literature on corporate governance, the political 
struggle behind this evolution of private authority is largely unaccounted for.
 These observations are most obvious for the case of accounting standards. Here, the 
ﬁrst substantial attempts for transnational harmonisation have already been undertaken in the 
early 1970s. During the 1990s, the controversy between US GAAP, IAS and various national 
standards in Europe has dominated the issue area. Numerous European companies have applied 
US GAAP to be listed on the NYSE. Recently, the EU has decided that European companies 
have to adapt the (private) IAS standard by 2005. In the aftermath of Enron, even US authorities 
consider the acceptance of these rules. Public auditing standards, however, have been tightened 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also affecting numerous European companies.
 Given these developments, the project will focus on the following research questions:
• Does private authority lead to a substantial convergence of corporate governance / accounting 
regulation?
• Does private authority provide the foundation for a public codiﬁcation of corporate 
governance / accounting standards on the national and international level?
• How can we explain the evolution of private authority on corporate governance/ accounting, 
both in terms of contents and its importance for the regulation of the issue area?
Conventional explanations of the evolution of private authority on corporate governance focus 
on the functional requirements of liberalised markets for the harmonisation of standards (cf., 
e.g., Weil, Gotshal and Manges 2002:1). Furthermore, competing substantial claims are mostly 
being discussed in a technical manner, assuming that standards are mainly a question of the most 
(market-) efﬁcient solution. Our combination of a transnational political economy approach 
with the resource dependency approach on transnational policy networks, in contrast, focuses 
on the interaction between economic as well as institutional structures and the concrete interests 
of different socio-economic groups. Thus, the rather conservative, debtor-oriented accounting 
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standards of the German HGB may, e.g., be explained by the strong role of the German banks 
during the evolution of this model of capitalism. The increasing importance of IAS is also due 
to EU institutional harmonisation requirements. The complex, case-oriented structures of US 
GAAP are, inter alia, caused by the lobbying efforts and the evasive behaviour of US companies 
in diverse economic sectors. 
 Utilizing this approach, the project aims at the development of a description and 
explanation of the content and role of private authority within the regulation of corporate 
governance in general and accounting in particular. In reaching this objective, the project 
intends to provide a substantial contribution to three major social science literatures:
• The issue of private authority is at the cutting edge within the discussion on globalisation in 
general and on ﬁnancial markets in particular (Cohen 2002:442). Although Susan Strange 
(1996) made wide-ranging claims regarding the increasing role of private authority on a 
global scale, these claims have not yet been matched with systematic empirical research. The 
conceptual discussion on global private authority is still in its infancy (cf. Cutler, Hauﬂer 
and Porter 1999, Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000, Ronit and Schneider 2000, Hall and 
Biersteker 2002). Empirical studies very much concentrate on the speciﬁc issue of business 
codes of conducts (e.g., Hauﬂer 2001), but hardly take the role of private authority for a 
fundamental convergence of capitalist models into account. The most important exception 
are studies on credit rating agencies (Sinclair 1994, Kerwer 2001). These studies, however, 
have not yet been matched by investigations in other fundamental economic co-ordination 
mechanisms.
• Within the literature on (global / multi-level) governance, the issue of private authority is 
rather neglected. As far as private actors are taken into account, this literature focuses on 
public-private interaction, as in the discussion of (transnational) policy networks (Nölke 
2000). Existing studies on private self-regulation remain restricted to the national level 
(e.g., Streeck/Schmitter 1985).
• The discussion on accounting is dominated by professional literature. There are only few 
social science studies of this issue area (cf. Mennicken 2002) and there is no comprehensive 
study of the transnational political economy of private accounting standards, although we 
may draw on some work on regulatory competition (Sunder 2002).
Private authority has a strong tendency to be hidden from the public. This is even more relevant 
on the global level. Only the interested organisations and a few technical experts are aware of 
it. There is hardly any transparency or even democratic accountability. Given the increasing 
relevance of private authority in general and its crucial role for corporate governance in 
particular, the project will make the workings of this form of governance more accessible, also 
to a wider, non-specialist public, which very much contributes to its societal relevance.
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5. Research Objectives
At the conclusion of the research programme we hope to have achieved the following 
objectives:
• Chart the different changes that have taken place in the area of regulating shareholder 
relations in our different arenas;
• Assess the extent to which these changes amount to a convergence of existing (national) 
models;
• Chart through which different types and levels of governance regulation is changing;
• Explain how these different types and levels of governance are interrelated (and thus):
• Develop an integrated explanation of observed shifts in corporate governance regulation 
with regard to both content and form;
• On the basis of this explanation contribute to our understanding of current shifts in 
governance, both within and beyond multi-level Europe;
• Thus improve upon existing concepts and theorisations of multi-level and global governance 
and outline a research agenda in which our ﬁndings and insights with regard to observed 
shifts in governance may also be applied to other areas;
• To ﬁll – on the basis of our ﬁndings - an important lacuna within the literature on corporate 
governance and thus contribute to a better understanding of the issues at stake in the 
current political struggles over corporate governance reforms and thus to inform the public 
debate.
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